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Research

the state.
Irrigation and other measures
would prevent a recurrence of the dust-lx>wl
syndrome and had maximized the productivity
of the richly fertile soil. Nevertheless,
Nebraska was still "blessed" with more than
its share of transient dust.
'!'he incomparable Nebraska sunsets are often attributed to
this relatively high concentration of dust
particles blown about by the famed Nebraska
wind.
Just such a wind and just such a
particle of dust had now successfully conspired to enter Gail's right eye, with the
wrongful intention of inflicting great physical suffering upon her.
And she knew very
well, as a contact lens wearer and a veteran
of countless "contact attacks," that she had
indeed contracted a piece of dust in her eye,
underneath her right lens.
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The past ten years of debate about animal research have made at least one thing
clear:
progress in this field, indeed, gocd
arguments about the issue, will require a
blending of scientific acumen and philosophical sophistication.
Philosophy without science is empty; one cannot, for example, draw
specific conclusions from the harm principle
unless one has a clear and objective understanding of whether a situation causes harm.
If the subject is an animal, intuitions and
analogies with human suffering can be seriously misleading; a scientific study involving the animal's physiology and ethology can
be much nore successful in making such determinations.
Contrariwise, science without
philosophy is blind; a description of the
history of a test, its strengths and weaknesses, and the numbers of aninals involved,
does not, by itself, generate a conclusion
about animal welfare.

"Christ! " Tears flooded her right eye,
and she blinked it frantically.
It hurt
extremely.
She would have to wash it out.
Self-conscious of how her face looked with a
tear-laden, half-closed right eye, Gail approached Mrs. Glenn, the pageant coordinator,
and asked if she knew where the wemen' s restroom was.
Mrs. Glenn approached the young
company head who stood listening in front and
whispered to him. He pointed to a metal door
on the side of the plant building and whispered a few brief directions.
Mrs. Glenn
returned to where Gail stood futilely massaging her sore eye, pointed out the metal door,
and repeated the directions she had received.
Tears spilling down profusely, Gail walked
straight for the ncminated door, more by
pained sense of direction than by sight, and
entered the building.
She walked through
what she had been told would be the lunchroom. All she knew was the sharp pain in her
eye; she didn't see, or care about, the crude
benches and tables or the vending machines
that together comprised the plant lunchroan.
She nounted the stairs at the end of the
lunchroan and turned to her right down the
wide concourse as she had been told to do.
She hardly saw where she was walking, her eye
hurt so much. The restroans were supposed to
be on the left.
The blurry sight of a door
rrarked "WCMEN" only a couple feet down a dim
hallway appeared to her on the left.
Gail
turned into the hallway and pushed open the
door to the wanen I s roan.

Early works, such as Singer's Animal
Liberation, provide a sustained developnent
of the philosophical arguments but are viewed
with suspicion by the scientific community
because (to cite the most respectable reason)
his ignorance about animals shines through
many of his specific complaints. '!'he work of
Dallas Pratt provides a great deal of hard
data about the scientific merit of many comnon laboratory procedures but lacks the general framework within which ethical judgments
about those procedures can be deduced and
defended.
Andrew Rowan's new bcXJk, Of Mice,
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sometimes associated with arguments about
animal welfare.
This balance certainly enhances Rowan's credibility in the eyes of
researchers.

Models, and Men:
~ Critical Evaluation of
Aninal Research (hereafter, Cl'IMM) is an attempt to meet the demand for a work in which
these two elements are combined to provide a
rational and scientifically respectable evaluation of research involving non-human animals.
(Bernard Rollin was perhaps the first
to do this, but his book, Aninal Rights and
Human Morality, is broader in scope and, as a
result, contains less specific information of

However,

supfX)rters of current research

practices will not find an all-accepting
colleague.
The basic theme of the book is a
sustained criticism of many specific procedures and assumptions and of the bureaucracy
which perpetuates them.
For example, Rowan
criticizes the LD50 test and its validity as
a measure of toxicity but also claims that
"in LD50 tests, the main problem is political
and bureaucratic" ( p. 214).
This claim is
followed by a list of specific changes the
regulatory agencies should be making to correct these wrongs.

the sort that makes Rowan's book so valuable. )
Scientists may be angered at his
attacks on many widely held assumptions about
basic research and testing, and advocates of
animal welfare may be dismayed at the refusal
to issue a much broader condemnation of research involving animals, but both groups
must recognize the necessity of bringing
together scientific analysis and philosophical inquiry.

One of Rowan's stated goals is to .PJt
the debate about aninal research in proper
context.
This generally involves an extensive historical survey; the nature of biomedical research, the development of the antivivisection IlDvement, the use of animals as
research m:Jdels, the use of primates in the
laboratory, the dis.PJte about "pound seizure"
and the development of the Draize test are
some of the things introduced by an historical account of their development.
In other
cases, such as the use of animals in education or psychological research, the context
is provided by a careful and well-balanced
attempt to provide reasonably accurate statistics about the numbers of animals affected.
I t is likely that any reader will find
some of this material familiar and perhaps
even trite and some of it !lOre detailed than
the subject requires, but the remarkable
wealth and accuracy of the information insures that much will be educational and useful.
At the very least, these sections of
the book are a valuable source of well-documented and accurately presented background
information, an essential resource for anyone
who deals with these issues.
Of course,
there is inevitably some oversimplification
(his survey of the philosophical debate from
the 17th to the 19th century covers two and a
half pages) , but the basic points are well
presented.

It is perhaps inevitable that no work
which tries to satisfy two such disparate
goals will be as successful at either as a
book .which restricts itself to one or the
other.
Thus, Rowan's account of the scientific merit of animal research often relies
on citations rather than analysis when it
comes to details, and his philosophical arguments are nowhere near as sophisticated or
complete as those to be found in Regan's
work. Since Rowan is by training a scientist
rather than a philosopher, it is unsurprising
that there are problems evident in the latter
sphere.
Nonetheless, there is much of value
in ~ for philosophers, scientists, and the
interested public alike, and the specific
criticisms I shall discuss in this review
should always be read against the backdrop of
a general admiration for Rowan's project and
his treatment of the issues.
At the very
least, I would wish that every member of my
institutional animal care and use committee
would take the time to study and discuss this
work.
The position Rowan defends, like his
approach, falls between two !lOre familiar
points.
Some people in the animal welfare
IlOVement may object to one of Rowan's basic
assumptions, i.e., that research on animals
can often be justified.
Rowan also offers
sharp criticism of some of that IlDvement ' s
claims about the benefits (or lack thereof)
of such research.
An early section on "misstatements and misrepresentations" (PP. 269) and all of Chapter 12, "Aninal Research:
A Case for the Defense" (pp. 179-85) challenge some of the sweeping claims which are

One of the !lOst striking features of
Rowan's arguments is their unusual specificity; one would be hard-pressed to find any
general statements at all about animal research in this book.
Instead, one finds
painstaking distinctions am:Jng topics and
issues that are all too often lumped together
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under a
search,"

vague label such as "animal re"alternatives to animal research,"

justified.
Similarly, the conclusions to be
drawn about anyone of the topics covered
tend to focus on the particular aspects of
that topic. Thus, in research in psychology,
some of the conclusions (pp. 147-8) involve a
challenging list of ways to reduce animal
suffering in psychological research.
What
one would like, in addition, is a steppingback and an evaluation of the similarities
and differences between the problems posed,
say, by psyhcological and biomedical research, by education and testing, and soon.
That sort of question would force a more
careful analysis of the connections between
technical specifics and philosophical generalizations.

or even "the LD50 test." This specificity is
both a strength and a weakness.
It is all too common to find debates in
which the participants are labeled either
"for" of "against" the use of animals in
research.
As Rowan ably points out, any
discussion of this topic ranges over such a
wide variety of questions that it is gross
oversimplification to try to apply the same
arguments to all of them.
Reasons against
(or in support of) the use of animals in education must be different, at least in detail, froin arguments against the use of the
LD50 test or other aspects of toxicology
testing. Moreover, arguments against the use
of animals in high school science fairs will
not speak. to the question of practice surgery
for veterinary students.
Rowan's book is an

The fragmentation is to some extent
reflected in the organization of the book.
It would certainly seem more natural, for
example, to include the chapters on toxicology testing in Section II, thereby grouping
them with the other chapters which explore
specific uses of animals.
Chapters 11 and
12, on concerns of the animal welfare movement and responses to some of that movement I s
charges, do not fit very well in that section
and would cohere more easily with the material in Section IV.
Such organizational problems may reflect a weakness in the conception
of the connections between the various topics.

extensive catalogue of the myriad ways in
which animals are used in the laboratory and
the different goals,
justifications, and
objections associated with the
different
uses.
This sort of comprehensive survey comes
at a price. With so many topics covered, the
reader may become numbed by t.echnical data
and numbers and by an occasional lapse into
jargon--for example, "one member is looking
at the response of peritoneal macrophages to
irritant-induced
release
of
chemotactic
agents" (p. 226).
This is really a minor
complaint, though, since for the most part,
Rowan does an admirable job of presenting
information accessibly.
Without the mnnbers
and technical data, the work would lose much
of its unique value.

As suggested earlier, the philosophical
elements of ROwan's arguments are the weakest
aspect of the book.
In fairness, it must be
reiterated that Rowan's goal is not to give a
sustained and single-minded
philosophical
argument for a specific feature, and he does
succeed in highlighting those points at which
standard philosophical arguments become relevant to a scientific discussion and vice
versa.
However, Rowan's discussion of "The
M::lral Question" is almost completely contained in one chapter, and more than half of
that chapter is an historical survey.
As a
result, only about three pages (pp. 257-60)

Most of the topics covered are absolutely central to the debate.
In a few cases
(most notably, the entire chapter devoted to
the "pound seizure" issue), Rowan seems to
devote the same time and energy to an issue
that is currently "hot" but not as fundamental as some of the others covered, but the
essential areas nonetheless receive adequate
attention.

are devoted to a discussion of the philosophical arguments. All of this will be useful
--and accessible--to the non-philosophical
reader who may be =nsidering this debate for
the first time but will not provide any new
material for those with any familiarity wit.'l
the topic. Moreover, references to "apparent

The more serious problem is that the
discussion is often fragmented;
separate
discussions of chronic and acute toxicology
studies, for example, can lead one to lose
sight of the elements they have in comrron,
namely, that any test which is necessary to

philosophical sophistry" (p. 259) p.1t the
entire theoretical underpinnings of the issue
in a stereotypically negative light.

insure the safety of any substance is thereby
BETWEEN THE SPECIES
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Rowan
occasionally touches on other
issues about which philosophy has much to
contribute.
The discussions of scientific
method, of consciousness, and of the definition of suffering are the most obvious examples.
One cannot help but think that a better understanding of the "apparent philosophical sophistry" in these areas would have
resulted in a stronger and more sophisticated
analysis.
As it is, Rowan's remarks tend to
be somewhat vague and llilsatisfying.

JOHN S'ro:::KWEIL

The Schweitzer Center

In an earlier "Opinion" column (BTS 1/3,
Summer, 1985), I stated, "the processes extinguishing the gods, tribes, and species are
the same." This view suggests that to protect gods may be required of us i f species
are to be protected.
It also suggests that
measures for the protection of species and
nature, if successful, may also protect the
gods.
Can any dour atheist accept these
relationships?
And how can we protect gods
or God, given that they are rather convincingly believed to be dead?
I f the gods are
not alive, or are not products (projections,
according to one view) of present cultures,
or are old gods, much recent writing holds
that they cannot be made real for us, cannot
be brought to have real bearing upon our

Perhaps the best way to sum up the
style, tone, and substance of CM1M is to note
that it exemplifies the position that is
championed by the Scientists' Center for Animal Welfare (SCAW), the official line of the
Humane Society of the United States (HSUS),
and that portion of NIH that is promulgating
new regulations governing animal welfare.
That is, Rowan is part of a movement which is
firmly rooted within the scientific community
but which is cognizant of and sympathetic to
the need to raise serious lToral questions
about the use of animals in research.
The
philosophical arguments which justify those
questions are less important in this context
than the fact that the questions are being
addressed.

lives.
Certainly this must be the case, i f
these gods or this God are truly dead, although such a viewpoint is not quite the same
as would be a view which held that the gods
might in their own time and at their discretion, not brought back by us, reappear.
Probably they will not be forced into existence overtly nor, more deceptively, through
the making of so dismal a worldly situation,
including the extinction of species, that the
gods must (we insist) intervene if they exist
and are either just or CXJIl\passionate.
We
shall probably not be able to force the gods
to reappear, or to save nature by driving
nature to the wall and extinguishing species
altogether.
Somehow we must ourselves relent.
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Still, the processes that have destroyed
the gods, tribes, and species are largely the
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